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1. Introduction  
The important problem in network security which solution is urgently needed is the 
investigation of counteraction between malefactors and defence systems in computer 
networks, including the Internet, and the creation of effective cyber-defence systems.  
It is important to underline that experienced malefactors realize sophisticated strategies of 
cyber-attacks. These strategies can include: 
 Information gathering about the computer system under attack, detecting its 
vulnerabilities and defence mechanisms; 
 Determining the ways of overcoming defence mechanisms (for example, by simulating 
these mechanisms); 
 Suppression, detour or deceit of protection components (for example, by using slow 
(“stretched” in time) stealthy probes, separate coordinated operations (attacks) from 
several sources formed complex multiphase attack, etc.);  
 Getting access to resources, escalating privilege, and implementation of thread intended 
(violation of confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc.) using the vulnerabilities detected;  
 Covering tracks of malefactors’ presence and creating back doors.  
Defence mechanisms should support real-time fulfilment of the following operations:  
 Implementing the protection mechanisms appropriated to the security policy (including 
proactive intrusion prevention and attack blocking, misinformation, concealment, 
camouflage, etc.);  
 Vulnerability assessment, gathering data and analysis of the current status of the 
computer system defended;  
 Intrusion detection and prediction of the malefactors’ intentions and actions;  
 Direct incident response, including deception of the malefactors, their decoy with the 
purpose of disclosure and more precise determining the malefactors’ purposes, and 
reinforcement of critical protection mechanisms;  
 Elimination of intrusion consequences and detected vulnerabilities, adaptation of the 




The design and implementation of effective cyber-defence system is a very complicated 
problem. According to contemporary view the prospective network cyber-defence systems have 
to be fully integrated and multi-echeloned ones. To effectively detect computer attacks or 
unauthorized operations and to flexibly react on them, it is needed to carry out the 
continuous control of network functioning, analyze possible risks, collect knowledge about 
counteraction, detection and reaction methods and use them for defence reinforcement.  
Besides, the effective cyber-defence should include the mechanisms of attack prevention, 
detection, source tracing and protection as well as can only be achieved by the cooperation 
of different distributed components ((Kotenko, 2005), (Kotenko & Ulanov, 2005)).  
For example, detection of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding attack 
((Chen & Song 2005), (Ioannidis&Bellovin, 2002), (Keromytis et al., 2002), (Mirkovic et al., 
2002), (Mirkovic et al., 2004), (Mirkovic et al., 2005), (Papadopoulos et al., 2003)] is most 
accurate close to the victim, but separation of legitimate is most successful close to the 
sources, therefore the security sub-systems (or teams) have to be located at different 
network places and tightly cooperate. 
The cyber-defence systems have to be adaptive and evolve dynamically with the change of 
network conditions.  
To realize these possibilities in prospective cyber-defence system, one must implement the 
dynamic behaviour, autonomy and adaptation of particular components, the use of methods 
based on negotiations and cooperation that lie in the basis of multi-agent systems and (or) 
autonomic computing.  
Furthermore, the prospective cyber-defence system has to provide at least three levels of 
cyber-security. 
First level contains “traditional” static cyber-defence mechanisms implementing identification 
and authentication, cryptographic protection, access control, auditing, network filtering, etc.  
Second level includes proactive cyber-defence mechanisms that provide information collection, 
security assessment, network state monitoring, attack detection and counteraction, 
malefactor deception, etc.  
Third level corresponds to cyber-defence management that fulfils the integral evaluation of 
network state, the choice of adequate or optimal defence mechanisms and their adaptation. 
This level is built on top of various non-adaptive security mechanisms, which makes it 
applicable for a wide range of cyber defences.  
The issues of modeling and simulation of network security have been actively researched for more 
than thirty years. The various formal and informal models of particular protection 
mechanisms were developed, but practically there are not enough works formalizing 
complex antagonistic character of network security. Understanding of network security as 
uniform holistic system is extremely hampered. It depends on great many interactions 
between different cyber warfare processes and is determined by dynamic character of these 
processes and different components of computer systems. Especially it is fair in conditions 
of the Internet evolution to a free decentralized distributed environment in which a huge number 
of cooperating and antagonistic software components (agents) interchange among 
themselves and with people by large information contents and services. Modeling and 
simulation of these aspects is supposed to put as a basis of our research. This will allow 
developing an integrated approach to construction of network security systems which can 
operate in aggressive antagonistic environment. 
 
Our long-term research goal is to develop a powerful simulation framework and software-
hardware environment which can help investigate the Internet attacks and defense 
mechanisms and elaborate well-grounded recommendations to choose efficient defense 
mechanisms and develop effective cyber-defence systems.  
In our previous papers ((Kotenko, 2005), (Kotenko & Ulanov, 2005), (Kotenko, 2007)) we 
have examined the common approach to agent-based simulation of network defense 
mechanisms, types of team-based cooperative defense, and various adaptation schemas.  
This paper considers and advances the approach to agent-based simulation of cyber-attacks 
(Distributed Denial of Service, network worms, botnets, etc.) and distributed cooperative multi-level 
cyber-defence for the exploration of prospective intelligent cyber-defence systems.  
The approach is based on the agent-based simulation of cyber-attacks and cyber-protection 
mechanisms which combines discrete-event simulation, multi-agent approach and packet-
level simulation of network protocols.  
We analyze various methods of counteraction against cyber-attacks by representing attack 
and defence components as agent teams using the simulation environment developed. 
Various teams of defence agents are able to cooperate as the defence system components of 
different organizations and Internet service providers (ISPs).  
Thus, the paper represents the conceptual framework for modelling and simulation, the 
implementation peculiarities of the simulation environment as well as the experiments 
aimed on the investigation of distributed network attacks and defence mechanisms.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the common multi-agent 
modelling and simulation framework suggested and relates work. The classes of agents, 
used for network attack and defence simulation, and their cooperation schemes are 
considered in section 3. Section 4 describes the implementation peculiarities of the simulation 
environment under development. Section 4 demonstrates the examples of experiments 
provided with the simulation environment. Conclusion surveys the main results of the 
paper. 
 
2. Simulation Framework  
The multi-agent approach to simulation supposes that the cyber-counteraction is represented as 
the interaction of different teams of software agents ((Kotenko, 2005), (Kotenko & Ulanov, 
2005)). The aggregated system behaviour becomes apparent by means of local interactions of 
particular agents in dynamic environment that is defined by the model of computer 
network. 
Agents of different teams can be in indifference ratio, cooperate or compete up till explicit 
counteraction. Agents are supposed to collect information from various sources, operate 
incomplete knowledge, forecast the intentions and actions of other agents, try to deceive the 
agents of competing teams, react to actions of other agents. Every team member might have 
different information about actions done by other team members.  
Therefore, the model of agent behaviour must be able to represent the incompleteness of 
information and the possibility of accidental factors. Besides, the agent behaviour depends 
on information that the team has and on its distribution on the set of particular agents. The 
models of agent functioning are to foresee, what each agent knows, what task has to be 
solved and to which agent it must address its request to receive such information, if it is 
outside of its competence.  
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The general conceptual model of cybernetic agents’ counteraction and cooperation 
includes (Fig. 1) ((Gorodetski & Kotenko, 2005), (Kotenko & Ulanov, 2006)): 
 Ontology of application domain containing application notions and relations between 
them (we differentiate the problem ontology, the shared application ontology, the 
application ontology of particular team and particular agent);  
 Protocols of teamwork for the agents of different teams;  
 Models of scenario behaviour of agents for team, group and individual levels;  
 Libraries of agent basic functions;  
 Communication platform and components for agent message exchange;  
 Models of functioning environment, including topological, functional and other 
components;  
 Models that provide the interaction of teams (antagonistic and non-antagonistic 
competing or various kinds of cooperation).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Abstract model of team interaction 
 
The following main simulation components are represented on the basis of this approach:  
 Models of agent teams;  
 Models of team interactions;  
 Interaction environment model.  
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Models of agent teams are intended for the representation of investigated processes. They 
include: particular team ontologies, agent basic functions, agent classes, agent interaction 
protocols, behaviour scenarios.  
Team ontologies are based on the subject domain ontology and include the notions and 
relations used by agents of this team.  
The list of agent basic functions includes the following functions: initialization; shutdown; 
access to the agent ontology; management of active agents list; basic work with transport-
level modules (connection establishing, message sending, connection closing).  
The needed agent classes are defined for the teams. The amount of agents of predefined 
classes is set in each team.  
Agent interaction protocols are represented as the sequence of instructions with specific 
parameters. The type of instruction defines how to use these parameters. The conditions of 
protocol initialization provide communication selectivity for agents. Agent interaction 
protocols are based on the transport layer that is provided by the communication 
environment. For example, the developed protocol for agent team establishing is based on 
dividing agents into “clients” and “servers”. The first send the messages about their 
existence to “server”. Server contains the list of agents in the team. Periodically it checks the 
agents in this list to actualize it and to know which of agents are active. Agent team 
establishing protocol is the part of procedures for monitoring and recovery of agent 
functionality.  
Behaviour scenarios represent various stages of team actions. Adaptation procedures are 
implemented in scenarios to act depending on other team actions and environment reaction. 
Agent teams’ behaviour scenarios ensure action consistency maintenance.  
Models of team interactions include the models of antagonistic competing, team 
cooperation and adaptation.  
Model of antagonistic competing lies in the basis of competing teams’ interaction. This model 
defines the goals, subgoals, intentions and actions of competing teams that are aimed on the 
interaction environment or (and) the opponent team.  
Cooperative interaction happens between teams that pursue the same goal. The proposed 
model of cooperation is based on the exchange of information between teams. Such 
exchange is made to raise the effectiveness of reaching the common goal and occurs on 
several different levels with the use of agents of various classes. For example, in the task of 
cooperative network defence simulation it is possible to exchange attack signatures, network 
traffic data, filtering requests, etc. 
Adaptation is in reacting to the actions of other teams and environment changes by 
modifying the scenarios of team behaviour.  
Model of environment for agent teams’ interaction allows determining such interaction 
environments that are characterized by various representation granularity that depends on 
the requirements for simulation fidelity and scalability. 
 
As for every application domain the ontology represents the partially normalized set of 
notions that are to be used by other agents. The ontology defines the subset of notions that 
various agents use for cooperative solving of stated tasks. Each agent uses a certain part of 
application domain ontology.  
Each agent specialization is represented by the subset of ontology nodes. Some of ontology 
nodes can be shared by the pair or more of agents. Usually only one of these agents has the 
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detailed description of this node. Exactly this agent is the owner of the corresponding 
knowledge base fragment. At the same time some part of ontological knowledge base is 
shared for all agents. This part is the fragment that is to be the shared context (shared 
knowledge). The structure of agent team is described in terms of group and individual roles 
hierarchy. The mechanisms of agent interaction and coordination are based on the following 
procedures: action consistency maintenance; monitoring and the recovery of agent 
functionality; and communication selectivity ensuring. The specification of action plans 
hierarchy is made for every role.  
 
The main basis for the research is the agent teamwork approaches: joint intentions theory 
(Cohen & Levesque, 1991), shared plans theory (Grosz & Kraus, 1996) and the hybrid 
approaches (Tambe, 1997).  
It is supposed to use the combination of methods and models to form agent teams, to make 
agent decisions and to coordinate actions between teams and particular agents 
(Paruchuri et al., 2006):  
(1) traditional BDI-models which are defined by schemes of agents functioning determined 
by subject domain dependencies;  
(2) methods of distributed optimization on the basis of constraints that use local interactions 
while searching local or global optimum (Distributed Constraint Optimization, DCOP);  
(3) methods of distributed decision making on the basis of partly-observable Markov chains 
that allow to implement the teamwork coordination in the presence of uncertainty in actions 
and observations (distributed Partially Observable Markov Decision Problems, POMDPs);  
(4) game-theoretical models and auction models focusing on coordination between various agent 
teams that use market-based decision making mechanisms. 
In our approach it is offered that the agents’ teamwork is organized by the group (team) plan 
of the agents’ actions. In result, a team has a mechanism of decision-making about who will 
execute particular operations. As in the joint intention theory, the basic elements, allowing 
the agents’ team to fulfil a common task, are common (group) intentions, but its structuring 
is carried out in the same way as the plans are structured in the shared plans theory. The 
common (group, individual) intention and commitment are associated with each node of a 
general hierarchical plan. These intention and commitment manage execution of a general 
plan, providing necessary flexibility. During functioning each agent should possess the 
group beliefs concerning other team-mates. For achievement of the common beliefs at 
formation and disbandment of the common intentions the agents should communicate. All 
agents’ communications are managed by means of common commitments built in the 
common intentions. For this purpose it is supposed to use the special mechanism for 
reasoning of agents on communications. Besides it is supposed, that agents communicate 
only when there can be an inconsistency of their actions. It is important for reaction to 
unexpected changes of network environment, redistributing roles of the agents which failed 
or unable to execute the general plan, and also at occurrence of not planned actions.  
The mechanisms of the agents’ interaction and coordination are based on three groups of 
procedures:  
(1) Coordination of the agents’ actions (for implementation of the coordinated initialization and 
termination of the common scenario actions);  
(2) Monitoring and restoring the agents’ functionality;  
(3) Communication selectivity support (for choice of the most “useful” communications).   
 
The specification of the plan hierarchy is carried out for each role. The following elements of the 
plan should be described: initial conditions, when the plan is offered for fulfilment; conditions for 
finishing the plan execution (these conditions can be as follows: plan is fulfilled, plan is 
impracticable or plan is irrelevant); actions fulfilled at the team level as a part of the common 
plan. For the group plans it is necessary to express joint activity. To cope with the information 
heterogeneity and distribution of intrusion sources and agents used we apply ontology-based 
approach and special protocols for specification of shared consistent terminology. 
Another fundamental component of the research is represented by the studies on reasoning 
systems about opponent intentions and plans ((Charniak & Goldman, 1993), (Gorodetski & 
Kotenko, 2005), (Vilain, 1990), (Wellman & Pynadath, 1997)). The important components in 
this research are the methods of reflexive processes theory (Lefevre, 2003), game theory and 
control in conflict situations (Druzhinin et al., 1989).  
The agents are supposed to implement the mechanisms of self-adaptation and to evolve during 
functioning. The team of agents-malefactors evolves due to generation of new instances and 
types of attacks and to scenarios of their realization to overcome the defence subsystem. The 
team of defence agents adapts to malefactors actions due to changing the executed security 
policy, forming of new defence mechanisms and profiles instances. Therefore it is important to 
take into account the present studies in the area of adaptation (Silva et al., 2000), agent learning 
((Back et al., 2000), (Gamer  et al., 2006), (Gu &Yang, 2004), (Zou,  et al., 2006)), autonomic 
computing ((Horn, 2001), (Keromytis et al., 2002), (Want et al., 2003)), and combining artificial 
immune systems with different computational intelligence methods, such as fuzzy systems, 
neural networks, etc. ((Ishida, 2004), (Negoita et al., 2005)). 
 
3. Specialised Classes of Agents and their Cooperation Schemes  
Let us consider the main classes of teams and agents we currently use in our simulation 
framework. 
There are at least three different classes of agent teams (Kotenko & Ulanov, 2006):  
 Teams of agents-malefactors,  
 Teams of defence agents,  
 Teams of agents-users.  
 
Attack agents are subdivided at least into two classes:  
 “Demons” and  
 “Masters”.  
Daemons and masters are deployed on compromised hosts in the Internet on a preliminary 
stage. The class of attacks is defined by intensity of packet sending, IP address spoofing 
technique (no spoofing, constant, random, and random with real IP addresses), etc. 
 
To simulate distributed cooperative defence, the security agents belong to the following 
classes:  
 Information processing (“samplers”);  
 Attack detection (“detectors”);  
 Filtering and balancing (“filters”);  
 Traceback and investigation (“investigators”);  
 Traffic limiting (“limiters”).  
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The mechanisms of the agents’ interaction and coordination are based on three groups of 
procedures:  
(1) Coordination of the agents’ actions (for implementation of the coordinated initialization and 
termination of the common scenario actions);  
(2) Monitoring and restoring the agents’ functionality;  
(3) Communication selectivity support (for choice of the most “useful” communications).   
 
The specification of the plan hierarchy is carried out for each role. The following elements of the 
plan should be described: initial conditions, when the plan is offered for fulfilment; conditions for 
finishing the plan execution (these conditions can be as follows: plan is fulfilled, plan is 
impracticable or plan is irrelevant); actions fulfilled at the team level as a part of the common 
plan. For the group plans it is necessary to express joint activity. To cope with the information 
heterogeneity and distribution of intrusion sources and agents used we apply ontology-based 
approach and special protocols for specification of shared consistent terminology. 
Another fundamental component of the research is represented by the studies on reasoning 
systems about opponent intentions and plans ((Charniak & Goldman, 1993), (Gorodetski & 
Kotenko, 2005), (Vilain, 1990), (Wellman & Pynadath, 1997)). The important components in 
this research are the methods of reflexive processes theory (Lefevre, 2003), game theory and 
control in conflict situations (Druzhinin et al., 1989).  
The agents are supposed to implement the mechanisms of self-adaptation and to evolve during 
functioning. The team of agents-malefactors evolves due to generation of new instances and 
types of attacks and to scenarios of their realization to overcome the defence subsystem. The 
team of defence agents adapts to malefactors actions due to changing the executed security 
policy, forming of new defence mechanisms and profiles instances. Therefore it is important to 
take into account the present studies in the area of adaptation (Silva et al., 2000), agent learning 
((Back et al., 2000), (Gamer  et al., 2006), (Gu &Yang, 2004), (Zou,  et al., 2006)), autonomic 
computing ((Horn, 2001), (Keromytis et al., 2002), (Want et al., 2003)), and combining artificial 
immune systems with different computational intelligence methods, such as fuzzy systems, 
neural networks, etc. ((Ishida, 2004), (Negoita et al., 2005)). 
 
3. Specialised Classes of Agents and their Cooperation Schemes  
Let us consider the main classes of teams and agents we currently use in our simulation 
framework. 
There are at least three different classes of agent teams (Kotenko & Ulanov, 2006):  
 Teams of agents-malefactors,  
 Teams of defence agents,  
 Teams of agents-users.  
 
Attack agents are subdivided at least into two classes:  
 “Demons” and  
 “Masters”.  
Daemons and masters are deployed on compromised hosts in the Internet on a preliminary 
stage. The class of attacks is defined by intensity of packet sending, IP address spoofing 
technique (no spoofing, constant, random, and random with real IP addresses), etc. 
 
To simulate distributed cooperative defence, the security agents belong to the following 
classes:  
 Information processing (“samplers”);  
 Attack detection (“detectors”);  
 Filtering and balancing (“filters”);  
 Traceback and investigation (“investigators”);  
 Traffic limiting (“limiters”).  
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Samplers collect and process network data for anomaly and misuse detection. Detectors 
coordinate the team, correlate data from samplers, and detect attacks. Filters are responsible 
for traffic filtering using the rules provided by detector. Investigator tries to defeat attack 
agents. Limiter is intended to implement cooperative defence. Its local goal is to limit the 
traffic according to the team goal. It lowers the traffic to the attack target and allows other 
agents to counteract the attack more efficiently.  
There are three types of limiting:  
 By the IP address of attack target. When detector reveals an attack, it sends to limiter the 
attack target address. Limiter begins to drop the packets destined to the attack target 
with the given probability.  
 By the IP addresses of attack sources. When detector reveals an attack, it sends to limiter 
the attack source addresses (if detector manages to trace them). Limiter begins to drop 
the packets from these sources with the given probability.  
 According to the packet marking. Filter adds to the legitimate-classified packets the mark 
(it uses one of the packet fields). If limiter sees such mark it does not drop that packet.  
 
Different defence teams can jointly implement investigated defence mechanisms. Defence 
teams can interact using various schemes. In the one of them that detector acts which team 
is under attack (when attack is detected). It sends the request to agent-samplers of other 
teams to receive the information that might be relevant to the mentioned attack. The 
samplers of other teams reply on the request by sending the requested data. If attack is 
detected the detector from the victim network sends the information about attack agent 
addresses to the detector of team in which network this agent might be. Then this team tries 
to deactivate attack agent. Detector uses the protocol “limiting by the IP address of attack 
target” to let limiter start or stop the traffic limiting. One of the goals of filter is to add the 
mark in packets that passed through the filtering table.  
The main attention in cooperative mechanisms is given to the methods of distributed filtering 
and rate-limiting. These methods are to trace the attack sources and drop the malicious 
traffic as far from attack target as possible. The teams of defence agents are able to cooperate 
as the defence system components of different organizations and Internet service providers. 
In the paper we investigate three cooperative defence mechanisms:  
 DefCOM (Defensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh) (Mirkovic et al., 2005);  
 COSSACK (coordinated suppression of simultaneous attacks) (Papadopoulos et al., 2003);  
 full cooperation of defence components (suggested in the paper).  
 
The following agent classes are proposed to introduce in compliance with DefCOM 
architecture:  
 “Alert generator” – detects an attack and warns about it other hosts in the DefCOM 
network; attack is detected if the traffic exceeds some threshold;  
 “Rate limiter” – limits the traffic that is destined to the attack target;  
 “Classifier” – provides selective traffic limiting, tries to classify attack and legitimate 
packets and to drop the former. 
“Alert generator” agent is based on “detector” agent. It gathers traffic data from “sampler”, 
detects the IP-addresses of hosts that generate the greatest traffic. If it exceeds the given 
threshold the alert is generated.  
Agent “Rate limiter” is based on “limiter” agent. It can drop the packets destined to the 
attack target providing some volume of traffic.  
 
Agent “Classifier” is based on “filter” agent that receives filtering data from detector. This 
agent is able to filter the disclosed attack packets. It also marks the legitimate packets to let 
“limiter” pass them. DefCOM “Classifier” receives data from DDoS source network 
detection system D-Ward ) (Mirkovic et al., 2002).  
When “Alert generator” detects the attack it sends the attack messages to other agents. Then 
“Rate limiter” agents start to limit the traffic destined to the attack target. “Classifier” agents 
start to classify and drop the attack packets and to mark legitimate packets.  
 
COSSACK architecture consists of the following agent classes:  
 “Snort” prepares the statistics on the transmitted packets for different traffic flows; the 
flows are grouped by the address prefix. If one of the flows exceeds the given threshold 
then its signature is transmitted to “watchdog”;  
 “Watchdog” receives traffic data from “snort” and applies the filtering rules on the 
routers.  
Agent “snort” is based on the agent “sampler”. It processes the network packets and creates 
the model of normal traffic for this network (in the learning mode). Then, in the normal 
mode, it compares the network traffic with the model and detects the malefactor’s IP 
addresses which it sends to “watchdog”.  
Agent “watchdog” is based on the agent “detector”. It makes the decision about attack due to 
data from “snort”.  
Agent “filter” is used to simulate filter on the router. It is deployed on router and performs 
traffic filtering using data from detector.  
Detector-level cooperation is used to simulate “watchdog” cooperation. Detectors of 
different teams are able to transmit the filtering rules to one another due to “filter” agents 
deployed on routers. Cooperation is in the following: when a “watchdog” detects the attack 
it composes the attack signature; this “watchdog” sends it to the other known “watchdogs”; 
“watchdogs” try to trace in their subnets the attack agents that send attack packets; when 
they detect them the countermeasures are applied.  
 
Full cooperation architecture stipulates for the following classes of defence agents: 
“samplers”, “detectors”, “filters”, and “investigators”.  
In common, agent teams are able to interact using various cooperation schemes:  
 No cooperation: all teams work on their own;  
 Filter-level cooperation: team which network is the attack victim can apply the filtering 
rules on filters of other teams;  
 Sampler-level cooperation: team which network is the attack victim can receive traffic data 
from the samplers of other teams;  
 Poor cooperation: teams can receive traffic data from the samplers of some other teams 
and apply the filtering rules on filters of some other teams. Each team “knows” some 
other teams depending on cooperation degree;  
 Full cooperation: the team which network is an attack victim can receive traffic data from 
the samplers of other teams and apply the filtering rules on the filters of other teams. 
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Samplers collect and process network data for anomaly and misuse detection. Detectors 
coordinate the team, correlate data from samplers, and detect attacks. Filters are responsible 
for traffic filtering using the rules provided by detector. Investigator tries to defeat attack 
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traffic according to the team goal. It lowers the traffic to the attack target and allows other 
agents to counteract the attack more efficiently.  
There are three types of limiting:  
 By the IP address of attack target. When detector reveals an attack, it sends to limiter the 
attack target address. Limiter begins to drop the packets destined to the attack target 
with the given probability.  
 By the IP addresses of attack sources. When detector reveals an attack, it sends to limiter 
the attack source addresses (if detector manages to trace them). Limiter begins to drop 
the packets from these sources with the given probability.  
 According to the packet marking. Filter adds to the legitimate-classified packets the mark 
(it uses one of the packet fields). If limiter sees such mark it does not drop that packet.  
 
Different defence teams can jointly implement investigated defence mechanisms. Defence 
teams can interact using various schemes. In the one of them that detector acts which team 
is under attack (when attack is detected). It sends the request to agent-samplers of other 
teams to receive the information that might be relevant to the mentioned attack. The 
samplers of other teams reply on the request by sending the requested data. If attack is 
detected the detector from the victim network sends the information about attack agent 
addresses to the detector of team in which network this agent might be. Then this team tries 
to deactivate attack agent. Detector uses the protocol “limiting by the IP address of attack 
target” to let limiter start or stop the traffic limiting. One of the goals of filter is to add the 
mark in packets that passed through the filtering table.  
The main attention in cooperative mechanisms is given to the methods of distributed filtering 
and rate-limiting. These methods are to trace the attack sources and drop the malicious 
traffic as far from attack target as possible. The teams of defence agents are able to cooperate 
as the defence system components of different organizations and Internet service providers. 
In the paper we investigate three cooperative defence mechanisms:  
 DefCOM (Defensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh) (Mirkovic et al., 2005);  
 COSSACK (coordinated suppression of simultaneous attacks) (Papadopoulos et al., 2003);  
 full cooperation of defence components (suggested in the paper).  
 
The following agent classes are proposed to introduce in compliance with DefCOM 
architecture:  
 “Alert generator” – detects an attack and warns about it other hosts in the DefCOM 
network; attack is detected if the traffic exceeds some threshold;  
 “Rate limiter” – limits the traffic that is destined to the attack target;  
 “Classifier” – provides selective traffic limiting, tries to classify attack and legitimate 
packets and to drop the former. 
“Alert generator” agent is based on “detector” agent. It gathers traffic data from “sampler”, 
detects the IP-addresses of hosts that generate the greatest traffic. If it exceeds the given 
threshold the alert is generated.  
Agent “Rate limiter” is based on “limiter” agent. It can drop the packets destined to the 
attack target providing some volume of traffic.  
 
Agent “Classifier” is based on “filter” agent that receives filtering data from detector. This 
agent is able to filter the disclosed attack packets. It also marks the legitimate packets to let 
“limiter” pass them. DefCOM “Classifier” receives data from DDoS source network 
detection system D-Ward ) (Mirkovic et al., 2002).  
When “Alert generator” detects the attack it sends the attack messages to other agents. Then 
“Rate limiter” agents start to limit the traffic destined to the attack target. “Classifier” agents 
start to classify and drop the attack packets and to mark legitimate packets.  
 
COSSACK architecture consists of the following agent classes:  
 “Snort” prepares the statistics on the transmitted packets for different traffic flows; the 
flows are grouped by the address prefix. If one of the flows exceeds the given threshold 
then its signature is transmitted to “watchdog”;  
 “Watchdog” receives traffic data from “snort” and applies the filtering rules on the 
routers.  
Agent “snort” is based on the agent “sampler”. It processes the network packets and creates 
the model of normal traffic for this network (in the learning mode). Then, in the normal 
mode, it compares the network traffic with the model and detects the malefactor’s IP 
addresses which it sends to “watchdog”.  
Agent “watchdog” is based on the agent “detector”. It makes the decision about attack due to 
data from “snort”.  
Agent “filter” is used to simulate filter on the router. It is deployed on router and performs 
traffic filtering using data from detector.  
Detector-level cooperation is used to simulate “watchdog” cooperation. Detectors of 
different teams are able to transmit the filtering rules to one another due to “filter” agents 
deployed on routers. Cooperation is in the following: when a “watchdog” detects the attack 
it composes the attack signature; this “watchdog” sends it to the other known “watchdogs”; 
“watchdogs” try to trace in their subnets the attack agents that send attack packets; when 
they detect them the countermeasures are applied.  
 
Full cooperation architecture stipulates for the following classes of defence agents: 
“samplers”, “detectors”, “filters”, and “investigators”.  
In common, agent teams are able to interact using various cooperation schemes:  
 No cooperation: all teams work on their own;  
 Filter-level cooperation: team which network is the attack victim can apply the filtering 
rules on filters of other teams;  
 Sampler-level cooperation: team which network is the attack victim can receive traffic data 
from the samplers of other teams;  
 Poor cooperation: teams can receive traffic data from the samplers of some other teams 
and apply the filtering rules on filters of some other teams. Each team “knows” some 
other teams depending on cooperation degree;  
 Full cooperation: the team which network is an attack victim can receive traffic data from 




4. Simulation Environment 
A multi-level software environment was supposed to be developed to implement the proposed 
approach. It differs from the known tools for agent-oriented simulation, as the basis for 
simulation the tools should be used which provide adequate simulation of network processes.  
The spectrum of possible approaches to modelling and simulation are differentiated from 
analytical to scaled-down and full-scale (see Fig. 2) (Perumalla & Sundaragopalan, 2004). 
The choice of model depends on the needed fidelity and scalability of simulation.  
The scalability is defined as number of network host (client hosts and routers) which can be 
simulated using the given method.  
The fidelity is defined as a degree of network and hosts destabilization used.  
Analytical models allow simulating large-scale Internet processes (including DDoS attacks 
and worms epidemics) but these models describe the processes only on abstract level.  
Packet-level simulation allows enough adequate rendering of such processes. The defence 
and attack actions are represented as the exchange of packets. This allows the high-fidelity 
simulation of datalink, network, transport and application layers.  
The highest fidelity is reached on the hardware testbeds, but the size of simulated network 
is restricted enough. 
We have chosen the packet-based approach as it provides acceptable scalability and fidelity. 
In Fig. 2, various program simulators, which can be used for simulation, are depicted: NS2, 




Fig. 2. Variety of used models 
 
We take into account the following main requirements to the simulation environment 
(Kotenko & Ulanov, 2005):  
 The detailed implementation of the protocols that are engaged in DDoS attacks. It is 
necessary at least to simulate the present DDoS attacks.  
 The ability of writing and plugging in the personal modules. It is necessary to 
implement the agent approach.  
 
 The ability of changing parameters during the simulation.  
 Implementation for OS Windows and Linux (or platform-independency).  
 Advanced graphical interface.  
 Free for use in research and educational purposes. 
To choose the necessary tool we fulfilled the detailed analysis of these simulation 
environments,  and OMNeT++ INET Framework was chosen (OMNeT++, 2010).  
The simulation environment architecture suggested includes the following components 
(Fig. 3):  
 Simulation Framework (discrete event simulator),  
 Internet Simulation Framework (modular simulation suite with a realistic simulation of 
Internet nodes and protocols),  
 Multi-agent Simulation Framework (modules representing the intelligent agents 
implemented as application),  
 Subject Domain Library (attack and defence modules).  
Simulation framework is a discrete event simulator. Other components are expansions or 
models for Simulation Framework. 
Internet Simulation Framework is a modular simulation suite with a realistic simulation of 
Internet nodes and protocols. The highest IP simulation abstraction level is the network 
itself, consisting of IP nodes. IP node corresponds to the computer representation of Internet 
Protocol. IP node can represent router or host. IP node in Internet Simulation Framework 
corresponds to the computer representation of Internet Protocol. The modules of IP node are 
organized as operating system process IP datagram. The module that is responsible for the 
network layer (implementing IP processing) and the “network interface” modules are 
mandatory. In addition one can plug the modules that implement higher layer protocols. 
Multi-agent Simulation Framework allows realizing agent-based simulation. It consists of 
modules representing the intelligent agents implemented as applications. There were used 
the elements of abstract FIPA architecture during agent modules design and 
implementation. Agent communication language is implemented for the agent interactions. 
The message transmission occurs above the TCP protocol (transport layer) implemented in 
Internet Simulation Framework. Agent directory is mandatory only for agent that 
coordinates other agents in its team. Agent can control the other modules due to messages.  
Subject Domain Library is the library used for imitation of processes from subject domain and 
containing modules that extend functionality of IP-host: filtering table and packet analyzer. 
This architecture was implemented for multi-agent simulation DDoS attack and defence 
mechanisms with the use of OMNeT++ INET Framework and software models developed 
in C++.  
Agent models implemented in Multi-agent Simulation Framework are represented with 
generic agent, attack and defence agents.  
Subject Domain Library contains various models of hosts, e.g. attacking host, firewall etc., 
and also the application models (attack and defence mechanisms, packet analyzer, filtering 
table).  
Fig. 4 shows the multi-window user interface of the simulation environment.  
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 The detailed implementation of the protocols that are engaged in DDoS attacks. It is 
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implement the agent approach.  
 
 The ability of changing parameters during the simulation.  
 Implementation for OS Windows and Linux (or platform-independency).  
 Advanced graphical interface.  
 Free for use in research and educational purposes. 
To choose the necessary tool we fulfilled the detailed analysis of these simulation 
environments,  and OMNeT++ INET Framework was chosen (OMNeT++, 2010).  
The simulation environment architecture suggested includes the following components 
(Fig. 3):  
 Simulation Framework (discrete event simulator),  
 Internet Simulation Framework (modular simulation suite with a realistic simulation of 
Internet nodes and protocols),  
 Multi-agent Simulation Framework (modules representing the intelligent agents 
implemented as application),  
 Subject Domain Library (attack and defence modules).  
Simulation framework is a discrete event simulator. Other components are expansions or 
models for Simulation Framework. 
Internet Simulation Framework is a modular simulation suite with a realistic simulation of 
Internet nodes and protocols. The highest IP simulation abstraction level is the network 
itself, consisting of IP nodes. IP node corresponds to the computer representation of Internet 
Protocol. IP node can represent router or host. IP node in Internet Simulation Framework 
corresponds to the computer representation of Internet Protocol. The modules of IP node are 
organized as operating system process IP datagram. The module that is responsible for the 
network layer (implementing IP processing) and the “network interface” modules are 
mandatory. In addition one can plug the modules that implement higher layer protocols. 
Multi-agent Simulation Framework allows realizing agent-based simulation. It consists of 
modules representing the intelligent agents implemented as applications. There were used 
the elements of abstract FIPA architecture during agent modules design and 
implementation. Agent communication language is implemented for the agent interactions. 
The message transmission occurs above the TCP protocol (transport layer) implemented in 
Internet Simulation Framework. Agent directory is mandatory only for agent that 
coordinates other agents in its team. Agent can control the other modules due to messages.  
Subject Domain Library is the library used for imitation of processes from subject domain and 
containing modules that extend functionality of IP-host: filtering table and packet analyzer. 
This architecture was implemented for multi-agent simulation DDoS attack and defence 
mechanisms with the use of OMNeT++ INET Framework and software models developed 
in C++.  
Agent models implemented in Multi-agent Simulation Framework are represented with 
generic agent, attack and defence agents.  
Subject Domain Library contains various models of hosts, e.g. attacking host, firewall etc., 
and also the application models (attack and defence mechanisms, packet analyzer, filtering 
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The management window has the time axis with the system events: opening or closing the 
TCP connection, attack signals, defence acts, etc.  
The simulated network window depicts the network hosts and channels. Hosts can fulfil 
different functionality depending on their parameters or a set of internal modules. Internal 
modules are responsible for functioning of protocols and applications at various levels of 
OSI model. Hosts are connected by channels which parameters can be changed. 
Applications (including agents) are established on hosts. Applications are connected to 
corresponding modules of protocols.  
The structure of generic host is depicted on the bottom left. The deployed agent is 
represented as the blue symbol of human in the frame.  
The environment allows to examine the different information describing the simulation 
functioning. For example, the diagram that shows the change in network parameters is 
depicted at the top right.  
The networks used for simulation consist of various subnets that are, for instance, the 
regions of responsibility of various ISPs.  
For example, one can mark out the defence subnet where the attack victim is located, the 
intermediate subnets where the standard hosts generate generic network traffic, and attack 
subnets where the attack agents are located.  
The networks are built with the methods of generating topologies that are close to the real 
Internet (Mahadevan et al., 2005). 
There are the following specification elements to define the investigated network models, attack and 
defence mechanisms:  
 Network topology: quantity and types of hosts, channels between them and their types. 
The possibility to deploy certain type of application (or agent) depends on host type.  
 Defence team parameters: quantity of daemons; master’s address and port used for 
interactions; daemon’s port used to send attack packets; victim’s address and port; time 
of attack; attack intensity; address spoofing technique. 
 Attack realization parameters: victim type (application, host or network; one must 
define the IP-address and port of victim); type of attack (brute force (UDP/ICMP flood, 
smurf/fraggle, etc.) or semantic (TCP SYN, incorrect pack-ets, hard requests, etc.)); 
attack rate dynamics (can be constant or variable); adaptation scheme depending on 
attack severity, etc.  
 Defence team parameters: address of defended host; detector’s address and port for 
interactions; server’s reply size and delay time; adaptation scheme (changing of defence 
mechanisms) depending on attack severity, etc.  
 Defence mechanisms parameters: deployment location (source, intermediate or 
defended subnets); the stages the defence method can implement (attack prevention, 
attack detection, tracing the attack source, attack counteraction); attack detection 
technique (misuse and anomaly detection; one chooses one particular detection method 
or the set of methods), etc.  
 User team parameters: quantity of users; server’s address and port; time to start; 
quantity of requests to server, interval between them and their size; interval between 
connections.  
 Defence team cooperation parameters: scheme of cooperation.  
 Simulation parameters: simulation duration; quantity of experiments; initialization of 
random number generator. 
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represented as the blue symbol of human in the frame.  
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subnets where the attack agents are located.  
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of attack; attack intensity; address spoofing technique. 
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define the IP-address and port of victim); type of attack (brute force (UDP/ICMP flood, 
smurf/fraggle, etc.) or semantic (TCP SYN, incorrect pack-ets, hard requests, etc.)); 
attack rate dynamics (can be constant or variable); adaptation scheme depending on 
attack severity, etc.  
 Defence team parameters: address of defended host; detector’s address and port for 
interactions; server’s reply size and delay time; adaptation scheme (changing of defence 
mechanisms) depending on attack severity, etc.  
 Defence mechanisms parameters: deployment location (source, intermediate or 
defended subnets); the stages the defence method can implement (attack prevention, 
attack detection, tracing the attack source, attack counteraction); attack detection 
technique (misuse and anomaly detection; one chooses one particular detection method 
or the set of methods), etc.  
 User team parameters: quantity of users; server’s address and port; time to start; 
quantity of requests to server, interval between them and their size; interval between 
connections.  
 Defence team cooperation parameters: scheme of cooperation.  
 Simulation parameters: simulation duration; quantity of experiments; initialization of 




The developed simulation environment allows carrying various experiments aimed to 
investigate attacks and prospective defence strategies. One can vary network topology and 
configuration, structure and configuration of attack and defence teams, attack and defence 
mechanisms, team cooperation parameters etc. The evaluations of various effectiveness 
parameters of defence mechanisms are done on the basis of experiments results. The 
analysis of applying conditions is also fulfilled for these parameters. 
The attack parameters used in the experiments are as follows: Victim type – host (server that 
provides some service); Attack type – brute-force; Impact on the victim – disruptive; Attack 
rate dynamics – constant, variable; Agents’ set permanency – constant, variable; Possibility 
of exposure – discoverable filterable attack; Source addresses validity – valid (real), spoofed: 
random, subnet; Degree of automation – semi-automatic with direct communication.  
In the experiments we have used three defence methods: Hop counts Filtering (HCF) 
(Jin et al.,2003), Source IP address monitoring (SIPM) (Peng et al., 2003) и Bit Per Second 
(BPS). HCF consists in building the tables of subnets and amount of hops till them in the 
learning mode. Attack is found out on the basis of amount of hops differing from received in 
learning mode. SIPM uses the assumption that during attack a lot of new IP addresses 
appear. BPS allows detecting the attacker due to exceeding the normal traffic threshold.  
The other defence parameters are as follows: Deployment location – intermediate, defended 
subnets; Covered defence stages – attack prevention, attack detection, attack source 
detection, attack counteraction; Attack source detection technique – can detect when source 
address is not spoofed; Attack prevention technique – packet filtering; Technique for 
gathering of model data – learning; Determination of deviation from model data: thresholds 
(HCF, BPS), determination of fluctuation in probabilistic traffic parameter (SIPM).  
Let us consider three examples of experiments fulfilled where we analyzed different modes 
of DDoS attacks and defence: (1) experiment 1 - investigation of simple adaptation of attack 
and defence teams; (2) experiment 2 - investigation of different, suggested in the paper, 
cooperation modes between defence teams; (3) experiment 3 - investigation of cooperative 
defence mechanisms DefCOM, COSSACK and full cooperation.  
Let us consider the values of the main parameters that define the computer network models, 
attack and defence mechanisms that are used for the experiments.  
To create a topology for testing, we used the generator of networks that are close to the real 
Internet networks. The following basic network topology parameters were set: minimum 
amount of connection is 2, the amount of routes in simulated networks is 10, the 
probabilistic value  = 2.25 (Mahadevan et al., 2005)]. Routers are connected with the fiber-
glass data channels, propagation delay is 1 microsec; datarate is 2488 Mbit. Other hosts are 
connected by Ethernet data channels, propagation delay is 0.1 microsec; datarate is 100 Mbit. 
Clients are randomly connected to the routers of the basic network. The amount of clients is 
an input parameter for experiments (its initial value is 10). The defended server is d_srv. The 
basic parameters of network clients are as follows: server address "d_srv"; server port – 80; 
start time is a random value with the exponential probability distribution function (PDF) 
and mean 5 sec; one request per session is used; request length is a random value with 
normal PDF with mean 350 and dispersion 20 bits; reply length is a random value with 
exponential PDF and mean 2000 bits; Think time is a random value with normal PDF with 
mean 2 and dispersion 3 sec; Idle interval is a random value with normal PDF with mean 36 
and dispersion 12 sec; Reconnect interval is 30 sec. 
 
Let us consider below the results of experiments fulfilled. 
 
5.1 Investigation of simple adaptation of attack and defense teams 
The fragment of the network which was used in the first experiment is depicted in Fig. 5. 
The fragment of decision making and acting sequence is as follows (Fig. 6):  
 Normal work of users (interval 0 – 300 seconds). 
 Defence team: formation of the team; the team start using BPS method.  
 Attack team: formation of the team; after 300 seconds the team begins the attack actions 
(intensity of attack for every daemon - 0.5, no IP spoofing).  
 Defence team: data processing, attack detecting (using BPS) and reacting (interval 300 – 
350 seconds); blocking the attack, destroying some attack agents (interval 300 – 600 
seconds).  
 Attack team: after 600 seconds the automatic adaptation is fulfilled (redistributing the 
intensity of attack (0.83), changing the method of IP spoofing (Random)).  
 Defence team: data processing, failing to detect the attack (using BPS method) – 
Detector sees that the input channel throughput has noticeably lowered, but does not 
receive any anomaly report from sampler because BPS does not work.  
 Defence team: Changing defence method on SIPM (automatic adaptation); Data 




Fig. 5. Experiment 1: the Internet fragment and agent teams 
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Fig.  6. Scheme of teams’ acting 
 
5.2 Investigation of different, suggested in the paper,  
cooperation modes between defense teams 
The fragment of the network which was used in the second experiment is depicted in Fig. 7. 
We investigated the models of cooperation between distributed defence teams:  
(1) filter-level cooperation: the team whose network is under attack can apply filtering rules 
on the filters of other teams;  
(2) sampler-level cooperation: the team whose network is under attack can get the traffic 
information from the samplers of other teams;  
(3) “poor” cooperation: the teams can get the traffic information from the samplers of some 
other teams and apply filtering rules on the filters of some other teams (each team knows a 
subset of other teams depending on the cooperation degree);  
(4) “full” cooperation: the team whose network is under attack can get the traffic 
information from all samplers of other teams and apply filtering rules on all filters of other 
teams.  
Fig. 8 depicts the volume of input traffic before and after the filter of the team which 
network is under attack when the BPS method is used. 
The other effectiveness and efficiency parameters of different defence mechanisms which 
were investigated are as follows: rate of dropped legitimate traffic (false positive rate); rate 
of admitted attack traffic (false positive rate); attack reaction time.  
These parameters were investigated in dependence on the following input parameters: 
network configuration; attack intensity; IP address spoofing technique used in attack; 
internal parameters of defence mechanisms and their combinations; quantity and 




Fig. 7. Experiment 2: the Internet fragment and agent teams 
 
 
Fig.  8. Volume of input traffic before and after the filter 
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The best cooperative schema on the basis of output parameters is “full cooperation”. 
Samplers-agents cooperation played the crucial role in defence. It causes the permanent 
traffic data exchange between various defence teams. 
 
5.3 Investigation of cooperative defense mechanisms  
DefCOM, COSSACK and full cooperation 
Fig. 9 shows the example of DefCOM agents’ configuration in the tool developed. Agents 
“Filter” play the role of “Classifier”, “Limiter” – “Rate limiter” and “Sampler” with 
“Detector” – “Alert generator”. Defence team of d_srv host has the following configuration: 
detector is deployed on the host d_det (in the defended subnet), sampler – d_firewall (on the 
entrance to the defended subnet), two agents “filter” – on the hosts i_d_r[0] and i_d_r[1] (in 
the source subnets), limiter – r[0] (router that provides the connection to the defended 
subnet). Other basic parameters are as follows: detectors port for team interaction – 2000; 
interval for SIPM and BPS – 5 seconds; time shift for SIPM and BPS – 5 seconds.  
Fig. 10 shows the example of COSSACK agents configuration in the tool developed. Defence 
network consists of three agents “watchdog” that are simulated by the defence agent teams.  
Defence team of d_srv host has the following configuration: detector is deployed on the host 
d_det (in the defended subnet), sampler – d_firewall (on the entrance to the defended 
subnet), agent “filter” – on the hosts d_r (on the entrance to the defended subnet, before 
sampler), limiter – r[0] (router that provides the connection to the defended subnet). Two 
other teams consist of detector and filter in the source subnets (hosts i_cli[1] and i_cli[2], and 
i_d_r[0] and i_d_r[1] accordingly).  
 
 













Fig. 10. Configuration of COSSACK agents 
 
Fig. 11 shows the example of Full cooperation defence system proposed by the authors. This 
defence network consists of defence teams that are able to cooperate to reach the mutual 
goal.  
Each team has the following configuration: detector is deployed on the host d_det[i] (in the 
defended subnet), sampler – d_firewall (on the entrance to the defended subnet), agent 
“filter” – on the hosts d_r[i] (on the entrance to the defended subnet, before sampler), 
investigator is deployed out of defended subnet (“i” is the subnet number).  
The following cooperation schemes have been investigated in a set of experiments:  
 DefCOM: when an attack is detected “Alert generator” sends the attack messages to the 
other agents. “Rate limiter” agents start to limit the traffic destined to the attack target. 
Agents “Classifier” classifies, drops the attack packets, and marks the legitimate 
packets.  
 COSSACK (or filter-level cooperation): the team which network is the attack victim can 
apply the filtering rules on filters of other teams. When “watchdog” detects the attack it 
creates attack signature and sends it to the other known “watchdogs”; they try to trace 
in their subnets the attack agents that send attack packets; when they detect them the 
packet filtering rules are applied as close as possible to the attack source.  
 full cooperation: the team which network is the attack victim can receive traffic data 
from the samplers of other teams and apply the filtering rules on filters of other teams; 
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Fig. 11. Configuration of full cooperation defence system 
 
The investigation has been done on the basis of analysis of two main classes of parameters:  
 the amount of incoming attack traffic before and after filter of team which network is 
the attack victim;  
 false positive and false negative rates of defence team which network is the attack 
victim.  
 
Fig. 12 shows the examples of attack traffic inside the attacked subnet for the COSSACK 
(triangles), DefCOM (dots) and full cooperation schema (crosses). Attack starts at 300 
seconds. The random real IP spoofing technique is applied as the most complicated for 
detection (the addresses for spoofing are taken from the same network). SIPM is used as the 
defence method.  
Attack traffic for COSSACK is measured on the entrance to the defended subnet on filter. 
The significant traffic increase is noticed in the beginning of attack. But in the area of 350 
seconds the defence system detects the attack. Filtering rules are applied and the traffic 
inside the subnet is reduced (after 350 seconds). Attack signature is sent to the other defence 
components. They apply filtering rules in their subnets. The traffic on the entrance to the 
defended subnet is decreased due to their actions.  
The attack traffic inside the attacked subnet for DefCOM is represented with the dots in 
Fig. 12. The traffic was measured at the entrance to the subnet, since the last component in 
the subnet that changes the traffic is the limiter. It is deployed on the router that has four 
interfaces and the incoming attack traffic was summarized into one graph. In the area of 350 
seconds the defence system detects the attack and traffic is being limited before the 
defended subnet and being filtered in the source subnets. Rate limiter proceeds to limit the 
traffic because of the high attack traffic volume. But this cooperation schema succeeds to 
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Fig. 12. Attack traffic inside the attacked subnet for COSSACK, DefCOM and full cooperation 
 
The attack traffic inside the attacked subnet for the full cooperation schema is represented 
with the crosses in Fig. 12. Traffic is measured on the entrance to the defended subnet on 
filter. The significant traffic increase is noticed in the beginning of attack. But in the area of 
350 seconds the main defence team detects the attack requesting the traffic data not only 
from its sampler but from the samplers of other teams. Filtering rules are applied and traffic 
inside the defended subnet is significantly decreased (around 350 seconds). Attack signature 
is sent to the other cooperating teams. They apply the filtering rules in their subnets. The 
traffic on the entrance to the defended subnet is decreased due to their actions (after 350 
seconds). System succeeds to decrease the traffic much more due to permanent attack 
signatures renewing (400–450 seconds).  
The experiments implemented demonstrated that full cooperation shows the best results on 
blocking the attack traffic. It uses several defence teams with cooperation on the level of 
filters and samplers.  
DefCOM comes after full cooperation. Its advantage is in using the rate limiter before the 
defended network. It allows lowering the traffic during attack and letting the defended 
system work properly.  
COSSACK is the third. It is one of the examples of peer-to-peer defence network. It uses 
attack signatures transmission between agents to apply the filtering rules near the source. 
The communication overhead for cooperative defence is restricted by the communication 
selectivity procedures. The agent protocols can be executed only periodically or in the strict 
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Fig. 11. Configuration of full cooperation defence system 
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blocking the attack traffic. It uses several defence teams with cooperation on the level of 
filters and samplers.  
DefCOM comes after full cooperation. Its advantage is in using the rate limiter before the 
defended network. It allows lowering the traffic during attack and letting the defended 
system work properly.  
COSSACK is the third. It is one of the examples of peer-to-peer defence network. It uses 
attack signatures transmission between agents to apply the filtering rules near the source. 
The communication overhead for cooperative defence is restricted by the communication 
selectivity procedures. The agent protocols can be executed only periodically or in the strict 











This paper considered the approach to investigation of distributed cooperative cyber-
defence mechanisms against network attacks. The approach is based on the simulation of 
network cyber-attacks (Distributed Denial of Service, network worms, botnets, etc.) and 
cyber-protection mechanisms which combines discrete-event simulation, multi-agent 
approach and packet-level simulation of network protocols.  
The environment developed is written in C++ and OMNeT++. It allows imitating a wide 
spectrum of real life infrastructure attacks and defence mechanisms.  
A lot of different experiments were carried. They were aimed to investigate dependence of 
defence effectiveness parameters from network topology and configuration, structure and 
configuration of attack and defence teams, attack and defence mechanisms and defence 
teams’ cooperation.  
Experiments showed that team cooperation leads to the essential defence effectiveness 
improvement. The multitude of experiments we implemented demonstrated that full 
cooperation shows the best results on blocking the attack traffic. It uses several defence 
teams with cooperation on the level of filters and samplers. 
Future work is related with more thorough investigation of effectiveness of cooperation 
mechanisms for different teams and inter-team interaction of agents, implementation of self-
adaptation and self-learning of agents. We are planning to expand the attacks and defences 
library, elaborate particular components functionalities. 
One of the main tasks of our current and future research is to improve the scalability and 
fidelity of the simulation. We now in the process of designing and experimenting with the 
parallel versions of our simulation environment and developing a simulation tesbed 
combining a hierarchy of macro and micro level models of attack and defence (analytical, 
packet-based, emulation-based), and real small-sized networks. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper considered the approach to investigation of distributed cooperative cyber-
defence mechanisms against network attacks. The approach is based on the simulation of 
network cyber-attacks (Distributed Denial of Service, network worms, botnets, etc.) and 
cyber-protection mechanisms which combines discrete-event simulation, multi-agent 
approach and packet-level simulation of network protocols.  
The environment developed is written in C++ and OMNeT++. It allows imitating a wide 
spectrum of real life infrastructure attacks and defence mechanisms.  
A lot of different experiments were carried. They were aimed to investigate dependence of 
defence effectiveness parameters from network topology and configuration, structure and 
configuration of attack and defence teams, attack and defence mechanisms and defence 
teams’ cooperation.  
Experiments showed that team cooperation leads to the essential defence effectiveness 
improvement. The multitude of experiments we implemented demonstrated that full 
cooperation shows the best results on blocking the attack traffic. It uses several defence 
teams with cooperation on the level of filters and samplers. 
Future work is related with more thorough investigation of effectiveness of cooperation 
mechanisms for different teams and inter-team interaction of agents, implementation of self-
adaptation and self-learning of agents. We are planning to expand the attacks and defences 
library, elaborate particular components functionalities. 
One of the main tasks of our current and future research is to improve the scalability and 
fidelity of the simulation. We now in the process of designing and experimenting with the 
parallel versions of our simulation environment and developing a simulation tesbed 
combining a hierarchy of macro and micro level models of attack and defence (analytical, 
packet-based, emulation-based), and real small-sized networks. 
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